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Book Review of On the History of
Philosophy and Other Essays, by F.
Copleston

Michael G. Vater
Department of Philosophy, Marquette University
Milwaukee, WI

On the History of Philosophy and Other Essays. Copleston, F. Totowa, N.J.:
Barnes and Noble, 1979. 160 pp. $15.00

This is a collection of eight essays by the famed historian of
philosophy, six of them previously unpublished. The first two concern
the practice of the philosophical historian; the rest loosely group about
the theme of the validity of metaphysics. I shall first comment on the
most interesting of the second group. "Ethics and Metaphysics: East
and West" explores the limits of comparative generalizations about
Eastern and Western philosophy. When suitably qualified, statements
such as "Eastern philosophy tends to be metaphysically monistic, and
thus ethically relativistic" and "Western thought stands fast on the
concept of the individual and his value" convey reliable information.
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Copleston believes Eastern thought poses a challenge to Western
societies, for its moral vision remains embedded in a metaphysical and
religious view of man, while the West has put its concept of the value
of the human person in jeopardy in effecting the divorce of fact and
value.
In "Some Aspects of Medieval Philosophy" Copleston argues that
philosophy had considerably more independence in the Middle Ages
than the "handmaid of theology" cliche suggests. While the
demonstrability of "sacred doctrine" was always in question,
philosophy pursued its interest in formal logic unhindered. And if this
predominant interest in logic be viewed as the connecting thread of
the whole period, the so-called decline into fideism signaled by
thinkers such as Scotus and Ockham can be seen not as a loss of
speculative courage, but as the result of a heightened awareness of
the need for rigor in "proofs" and a more critical approach to
epistemology than the 13th Century evidenced. Copleston's simple
point: Aquinas was not the whole of the Middle Ages.
In "The Nature of Metaphysics" Copleston claims that the
"craving for generality" which makes metaphysics problematic to some
of his contemporaries is but the tendency toward conceptual
unification common to all forms of theoretical understanding.
Distinguishing between descriptive metaphysics and what he calls
"explanatory metaphysics," he notes the former is hardly
controversial, while the latter is almost necessarily disputable, for the
metaphysical mind moves from the general supposition of the
intelligibility of reality up to some Absolute or unconditioned One as a
necessary presupposition. Copleston candidly acknowledges the
religious significance of such an idea for him, but notes that
metaphysics will probably never be placed beyond dispute.
One would expect the two essays on the history of philosophy to
be the most interesting in the volume, but the reader who looks for a
profound theoretical discussion will be disappointed. For one who has
done the whole history of philosophy, questions about method seem
academic and tend to be answered by "I did it this way" or "common
sense." The first essay raises a host of questions: What is to count as
philosophy for the historian? Is argumentation the criterion for
distinguishing philosophy from religion? Should a history trace
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systematic issues or treat individual "great" philosophers? What about
biography and psychobiography? Should the historian merely recount
past philosophies or is his task to judge their truth or falsity? Should a
philosophy be explained as a product of its culture? Copleston finds
himself unable to articulate general criteria for solving these problems;
time and again, he retreats to "common sense" and personal
preference. Evidently the accomplished historian possesses prudence
to a surpassing degree.
A separate essay is dedicated to the problem of a history's
objectivity. Here the objectors are the ones in possession of criteria,
skeptics (straw men, really) who claim we are unable to separate fact
and fiction, who demand an absolute distinction of "data" and
"interpretation," or who demand the impossible, viz., the exclusion of
the logical possibility of error. Against such extravagant opponents it is
indeed easy to answer that data and interpretation somehow meet and
illuminate one another in the act of reading, that texts limit the
historian's reconstruction, and that, though error cannot be excluded,
all historical statements are revisable. One feels that Copleston's
answers are unsatisfactory, not wrong, but certainly not justified and
fully explained. For, unlike a Gadamer or a Roland Barthes, Copleston
fails to explore the "how" and the "why" of his "common sense," of his
objectivity, and to attend profoundly to what happens when he reads
an ancient text.
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